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Education in Responsibility in Order to Secure Human Rights in Times of Crisis 
 
Education in and awareness about human rights is generally seen as one of the less contentious elements of 
citizenship education. However, it would seem that, for the concept of human rights to have a real impact in today's 
world, theoretical knowledge of human rights standards should be complemented by an understanding of the ethical 
concept of individual responsibility. This concept could, moreover, prove to be a valuable tool in conceiving creative 
answers to some of the consequences of the crisis Europe has been facing. This crisis has affected especially the 
protection and realisation of socio-economic rights, as many States were left with increasingly less budgetary space to 
meet increasingly urgent societal demands. Over the last few decades, and already prior to the current crisis, many 
have called for a greater stress on ‘duties and responsibilities’, as it was perceived that ‘rights-talk’ alone did not 
provide all the answers. From a legal perspective, as well as from the side of human rights advocacy groups, however, 
these appeals were often met with scepticism and hostility. In answer to the often justified criticism, it is essential to 
make a distinction between the ‘legal’, the ‘moral’ and the ‘ethical’ realms. While an unnuanced greater focus on 
moral duties is potentially dangerous, education based on the proposed notion of ethical ‘responsibility’ would seem, 
on the contrary, essential for the survival of human rights and, hence, of the democratic society. 
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1 Introduction: Europe and human rights in crisis 
The financial crisis which has gripped almost the entire 
world in the past few years has had measurable 
consequences on the lives of individuals, especially in the 
field of the protection of socio-economic rights, but also 
in the field of civil and political rights. Especially the 
young have been hit hard. In countries such as Greece, 
Spain and Croatia, youth unemployment rates were close 
to or even significantly over 50% in early 2014 (Eurostat 
2014). The Council of Europe has warned that austerity 
measures have had ‘drastic and lasting’ consequences in 
the field of, inter alia, the rights to decent work, to an 
adequate standard of living, to social security, to 
housing, to food, to water, to education and to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health 
(CoE Commissioner for Human Rights 2013). The 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has 
called the fact that the young generation is 
disproportionally hit by the crisis ‘nothing less than a 
tragedy in the making’ and warned that “if no tangible 
improvements are made, Europe risks not only producing 
a “lost generation” of disillusioned young people, but 
also undermining its political stability and social 
cohesion, justice and peace, as well as its long-term 
competitiveness and development prospects in the 
global context” (CoE Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 
1885(2012)). If anything, the crisis has shown how hollow 
rights claims can sound when there is a breakdown on 
the ‘supply-side’ of rights and the corresponding duties 
and responsibilities to effectuate those rights are not or 
no longer fulfilled.  
Traditionally, the State has been seen as the main 
guarantor of human rights and, especially, of socio-
economic rights. Even if the traditional dichotomy 
between ‘negative obligations’, traditionally associated 
with civil and political (or ‘first generation’) rights, and 
‘positive obligations’, generally associated with socio-
economic (or ‘second generation’) rights, has been 
abandoned in recent years, it is clear that positive State 
action still remains an essential tool for the effective 
realisation of virtually all rights. However, the financial 
crisis has placed a heavy financial burden on many 
States, leading many governments to resort to austerity 
measures. Sharp reductions in government spending and 
a lack of economic possibilities, in turn, have gravely 
affected individuals’ opportunities and quality of life. It 
has become increasingly clear that contemporary demo-
cracies do no longer always have ready answers to the 
consequences of these kinds of structural crises. This in 
turn has fuelled distrust in the democratic model (see, 
for example, CoE Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 
1888 (2012)). When human rights demands remain 
unanswered, the risk exists that the human rights 
framework itself will eventually be questioned as merely 
idealistic and, hence, politically irrelevant. 
One possible answer to the current threat posed to the 
human rights framework could perhaps be found in the 
notion of ‘individual duties and responsibilities’. This 
notion, however, is not uncontested and any discussion 
on this topic comes together with potential pitfalls which 
could, in fact, further undermine human rights. 
Nevertheless, an increasing focus on individual ‘duties 
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and responsibilities’ can apparently be discerned. Its 
proponents come from different philosophical and poli-
tical strands, and include a number of leading political 
and religious figures from around the world. The main 
rationale underlying this appeal is the belief that such 
‘duties and responsibilities’ are necessary in order to 
counterbalance a perceived disproportionate stress on 
individual rights and a corollary atomised conception of 
the individual. These appeals have, as I shall illustrate 
below, been met with either scepticism or outright 
criticism from NGOs and other human rights advocates 
and scholars, who claim that a stronger focus on 
individual ‘duties and responsibilities’ risks putting into 
jeopardy the last sixty-or-so years of the human rights 
acquis. These criticisms must be taken very seriously. 
However, while the call for ‘duties and responsibilities’ 
certainly predates the current crisis, I believe the challen-
ges faced by many Europeans today also present an 
opportunity to re-visit this ongoing discussion, and to 
find a catalyst for change in it.  
In this article I will argue that one possible middle 
ground between both proponents and critics of the 
‘duties and responsibilities’ movement can be found in 
the need for education in individual responsibility, in 
which ‘responsibility’ has a deeper, ethical meaning than 
is generally applied to it. This educational focus on 
responsibility, as distinguished from a lecturing on or 
imposition of well-defined ‘legal obligations’ or ‘moral 
behaviour’ will, I believe, provide a valuable tool in 
bringing together a concept of a universally shared 
dignity and locally embedded commitments, nurturing 
(political) participation and aiding the conceptualisation 
of new answers to the ongoing socio-economic crisis.  
While much debate exists (see, for instance, the 
contributions in Print, Lange 2013) regarding the 
usefulness or even desirability of including education in 
‘civic competences’ (among which knowledge of and 
certain skills in human rights and responsibilities are 
often mentioned) into the school curriculum, I would 
argue that individual responsibility in the context of 
human rights—regardless of its value for the broader 
project of citizenship education—is essential for realising 
human rights and, also in the light of the current crisis, 
even for guaranteeing the survival and further 
development of the human rights framework as we know 
it today. In other words: I will limit myself to arguing that 
education in individual responsibility is essential for the 
effective realisation of human rights, although a logical 
consequence of this position is that I believe it should 
receive a place within the broader debate on citizenship 
education. 
 
2 Terminological and conceptual clarification 
2.1 Introducing the distinction 
The discussion regarding ‘duties and responsibilities’ and 
their relationship to human rights is marred with 
confusion and the use of vague language. While the 
notion ‘duties and responsibilities’ at first glance sounds 
sufficiently familiar, a closer look reveals that it is often 
used without much further qualification, referring simply 
to ‘things one is expected to do’. More often than not, 
the words ‘duty’ and ‘responsibility’, together with the 
term ‘obligation’, are used interchangeably. Other times 
these terms are assigned specific meanings, but even 
then significant conceptual differences can be found 
depending on the author. This vagueness poses a real 
threat, not only because misunderstandings inevitably 
arise, but also because non-legal realms and the legal 
sphere run the risk of being conflated, potentially leading 
to a weakening of the human rights legal framework. 
After all, if we agree that every human being has in-
alienable and universal rights, which are moreover legally 
protected, internationally as well as locally, we cannot 
simply place moral duties at the same level as these legal 
rights, potentially making the latter dependent on the 
fulfilment of what one or another authority feels is 
‘moral’ behaviour at any given moment. It is for this 
reason that the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR), for example, has always held that the (legal) 
right of freedom of expression also entails the right to 
issue opinions which ‘offend, shock or disturb’ (ECtHR, 
Handyside case, 1976), i.e. opinions which for some or 
even a majority of people are deemed morally offensive. 
These opinions can be legally prohibited or sanctioned 
only when a number of strict conditions, including a clear 
and foreseeable legal basis and a well-described legal 
aim, are met and the expression is a direct threat to the 
democratic society.
1
 In other words: legal restrictions can 
only be imposed when there is a specific kind of pressing 
societal danger and when certain well-established 
procedures are followed, not when certain standards of 
morality have simply not been met. 
Exactly because human rights are both a legal concept 
and a (not uncontested) moral idea, it is of paramount 
importance to separate legal prohibitions from moral 
judgments. I would therefore like to start by making a 
crucial distinction between three separate concepts, and 
by attaching a specific term to each of these concepts. I 
will base myself on the terminology as explained by 
authors such as Ost and Van Drooghenbroeck (2005) and 
Foqué (2015; forthcoming), which also finds a basis in 
the insights of Ricoeur (1990). Based on these authors, 
we can make a distinction between (a) an obligation, 
which is legal; (b) a duty, which is moral and (c) 
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2.2 The moral and the ethical 
Duty 
While the concept of a legal obligation can be presumed 
to be sufficiently clear, the distinction between the moral 
and the ethical realm begs some further explanation. I 
follow the aforementioned authors when they make this 
distinction and subsequently attribute to ‘duty’ (French: 
‘devoir’) a moral meaning, and regard such a moral duty 
to have, in reference to the work of German philosopher 
Immanuel Kant, in essence a deontological character. A 
‘duty’ is the action which is required by a moral law 
which one chooses and feels compelled to follow 
(prescribes for oneself). In human rights terms, a 'human 
duty'
3
 could therefore be considered the action one 
should undertake because it is required by (moral) hu-
man rights standards (the requirements of human 
dignity). In the case of Kant, the universal law which 
ought to be followed can be discerned by applying the 
categorical imperative in its three formulations. The first 
and main formulation is “Act only in accordance with 
that maxim through which you can at the same time will 
that it become a universal law”. In a second formulation, 
it is formulated as follows: “So act that you use 
humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of 
any other, always at the same time as an end, never 
merely as a means”. The third practical principle is “the 
idea of the will of every rational being as a will giving 
universal law” (Kant 2008). The similarities between 
Kant’s moral law – conceived long before the 
contemporary human rights framework was developed – 
and universal human rights are evident. If we regard 
(moral) human rights as being grounded in – and serving 
and protecting – human dignity
4
, then the moral duties 
each one of us has to respect the (moral) rights of the 
other can be regarded, in fact, as a subset of these 
Kantian duties (although in Kantian terms we would 
certainly not have these duties because others have 
rights). In other words, we have human rights because 
they protect elements of our human dignity. And 
because all of us, humans, have this inalienable and 
shared dignity, we must also respect each other’s dignity 
– and, hence, each other’s human rights. We have a duty 
to do so.  
Once aware of this need to strive towards respect for 
(and, in some cases, perhaps even the protection and 
effectuation of) this human dignity, it is necessary that 
the individual acts accordingly. In our behaviour we can 
surely choose not to fulfil these duties (i.e. not to respect 
another person’s life or privacy), but most of us agree 
that we should, regardless of whether there is any legal 
sanctioning forcing us to do so, or whether at the time 
we feel like it. These moral ‘human duties’ thus exist - 
and should be complied with - regardless of our own 
urges. Just as in Kant’s theory on the morality of duty, 
compliance with such ‘human duties’ therefore requires 
a strong concept of personal autonomy. This kind of 
autonomy consists of more than merely a superficial 
capacity to decide which step to take next, and has been 
aptly described by Harry Frankfurt (1971) as the capacity 
to formulate ‘second order volitions’ or by Gerald 
Dworkin (1988) as “a second-order capacity of persons to 
reflect critically upon their first-order preferences, 
desires, wishes, and so forth and the capacity to accept 
or attempt to change these in light of higher-order 
preferences and values”. In the case of human rights, and 
assuming human rights as their main task set out to 
protect human dignity, we can for the sake of argument 
accept that these higher-order values ought to refer to 
(at least) the respect for (and protection of) human 
dignity. In other words: an individual can be aware of his 
‘human duties’ by reasoning which behaviour is required 
in the light of the requirements of (the human rights 
theory based on) human dignity. He then has to use his 
autonomous capacity to act in this way, according to 
human rights principles, rather than simply allow himself 
to be driven by his urges, desires and feelings – all of 
which, perhaps, may well tempt him to behave in quite 
the opposite way. 
We could say that everyone, at the very least, has a 
fundamental duty to respect another person’s dignity,
5
 
and this respect translates into further human duties to 
respect individual rights. In the case of civil and political 
rights, a number of duties are obvious from the outset: 
we can (at minimum) find such universal individual 
human duties as the ‘duty to respect another person’s 
life’, a ‘duty to respect another person’s freedom of 
expression’ or a ‘duty to respect one’s private life’. In the 
case of socio-economic rights (as well as certain aspects 
of civil and political rights), the duty-bearers are, 
however, more difficult to identify. Perhaps people can 
have a ‘duty’ to respect one’s right to work, housing, 
food or education, but what really matters is who 
provides this work, housing, food and education (see, in 
this regard, O’Neill 2005). Here it becomes clear that not 
everybody can be expected to have the same kind of 
‘duty’ to provide. Legally speaking, States, through 
human rights conventions, have often taken upon them 
the obligation to take (progressive) action. However, this 
is ‘merely’ the law. If we believe human dignity is a 
paramount value worth protecting and furthering, we 
cannot be satisfied with such legal limitations, especially 
not when, in the face of crisis, many States have lost 
much of their capacity to undertake meaningful action. 
At the same time, however, not every individual can be 
expected to have the same responsibility to act, either. 
 
Responsibility 
We have hereby arrived at the third notion of the triad, 
namely that of ‘responsibility’. This notion fills a gap 
which was left by the aforementioned concept of moral 
duty. After all, there would seem to be some problems 
with these rational, abstract and universal higher-order 
values, in casu with human rights as moral principles. 
First of all, abstract human rights standards do not really 
say very much about the precise content of one’s actions. 
Secondly, the possibilities for individuals everywhere in 
the world to guarantee human rights are much broader 
than the ultimately quite restrictive legal obligations laid 
Journal of Social Science Education                                 ©JSSE 2014 
Volume 13, Number 3, Fall 2014                                                                   ISSN 1618–5293 
                        101 
down in human rights conventions, which, after all, are 
focused on States.  
First, let us have a look at the problem of the content 
of required behaviour. It is clear, for example, that I and 
everyone else have a right not be treated in an inhuman 
and degrading way (a right which is embodied in article 3 
of the European Convention on Human Rights) and 
therefore I can know that I also have a moral duty (and 
even a legal obligation) not to treat others this way. But 
what exactly constitutes degrading treatment and what 
does not? This can vary from one culture to another and 
from time to time. For instance, the abuse of religious 
symbols in interrogations can constitute a profound 
mental stress on an adherent to the religion in question, 
while, say, a non-believer may be less than impressed by 
the same actions. In other words: we know it is not 
‘right’ to treat someone inhumanely, but without a 
context and a historically embedded understanding we 
don’t necessarily know what constitutes this behaviour 
and what is ‘good’ to do (instead). In order to determine 
the content of our required actions, we need to take into 
account those sensitivities, cultural, temporal and local 
elements which give meaning to our existence. They, and 
not abstract rules, will ultimately determine what is 
‘good’ behaviour in a given situation. This is where a 
‘deeper’ and more ethical (and, one could say, 
Aristotelian) concept of responsibility could prove its 
value, a concept aptly and in extenso contextualised by 
Foqué (2015; forthcoming). ‘Responsibility’ is, in fact, a 
word of fairly recent vintage, having entered 
francophone and Anglo-Saxon vocabulary only in the 
second half of the 18
th
 century (Genard 1999). With its 
etymology in the Latin figure of the ‘sponsio’
6
 and its 
meaning of ‘answerability’, responsibility can be said to 
point not only at the human capacity to be aware of and 
reflect on one’s actions, to steer them in the desired 
direction and to accept the consequences, but also to the 
capacity to ‘answer’ the appeals by others, the capacity 
to be ‘called upon’ and answer those calls by others (see 
Foqué, 2015). With regard, specifically, to human rights, 
this ‘human’ or ‘fundamental’ responsibility then refers 
to the capacity to be held accountable for both one’s 
active violations and for the neglect to protect or 
effectuate human dignity where required. The ‘answer-
ability’ points to the capacity to be sensitive to and open 
towards - and subsequently ready to answer - the human 
dignity needs (often translated somewhat simplistically 
as ‘rights’) of those whom one encounters in life. 
Responsibility therefore, unlike a specific legal ‘obli-
gation’ or moral ‘duty’, refers not so much to a concrete 
action to be taken, but to an attitude of concern for the 
needs of others (and oneself). One could therefore say 
that, unlike a legal obligation or a moral duty, respon-
sibility refers not so much to an outcome as to a process, 
a reflective attitude. The scope of this individual 
responsibility depends on both the capacity of the 
individual and the situation he finds himself in (i.e. the 
actual ‘response-ability he or she has). This ability can 
change over time (for instance, because of old age or 
illness) and can be influenced by external circumstances. 
It can logically never be deemed so burdensome that it 
can no longer be borne by an individual. 
 
Towards a shared responsibility 
Secondly, then, there is the question of who is 
responsible to whom and for what. As individuals can 
only be expected to act in accordance with their actual 
abilities, there is a somewhat ‘fluid’ situation on the 
‘supply’ side of human rights. As a consequence, in 
general, the responsibility to respect, protect and effect-
tuate human dignity should be considered as a shared 
responsibility between individuals, corporations, insti-
tutions, and the State. Moreover, in different societies 
and different cultures the precise division of labour 
between these actors can vary. A stronger responsibility 
can exist, for example, in the case of specific 
relationships, such as those between parents and chil-
dren (and vice versa) or even between other family 
members, or within specific communities. It is an impor-
tant role for public debate to identify which distribution 
of responsibility, on a  societal level, fits best in any given 
time and place. When a State, for example, is strong 
enough to guarantee basic human rights in the form of 
care for the elderly, social housing or food distribution 
for the poor, this will inevitably diminish the need for 
other individuals to step in and ‘take responsibility’ 
(although, of course, these individuals will then indirectly 
take responsibility through the payment of taxes to the 
State in order to finance these services). However, 
whenever such strong institutions are lacking, as is often 
the case in times of crisis, other relationships and ways 
of taking responsibility should be conceived, unless 
human rights claims are to become no more than hollow 
and ultimately unanswerable calls for help. 
 
3 Advantages of (re-)introducing responsibility 
Let us now briefly (and in a non-exhaustive way) look at a 




A first very important advantage about focusing more 
on responsibility is that it moves the human rights deba-
te away from abstract moral principles of ‘what we want 
to protect’ and in the direction of questions of (practical) 
implementation, asking such questions as ‘what do we 
need to do in order to protect’ and ‘who needs to do 
what’. Nickel gives the example of the right to education 
in the case of Brazil. If rich people, he explains, send their 
children to (expensive) public schools, and the State does 
not have the money to invest in decent public education, 
this leaves the question how the right to education can 
be implemented if nobody considers to be bearing the 
corresponding duty or responsibility towards it (Nickel, 
1993). The same, as a matter of principle, would seem to 
apply to any human rights question. 
Secondly, questions regarding the priority of rights will 
come into the spotlight (Nickel, 1993). Most rights are 
not absolute (save, e.g., the prohibition of torture or 
slavery), which means conflicts of rights can arise and 
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must be solved by a balancing of individual and societal 
interests. Especially in the case of positive obligations by 
both the State and private actors, this means the 
outcome of this balancing act will depend also on the 
available resources and the allocation of these scarce 
resources. When framed merely in terms of ‘rights’, 
everyone whose human rights claim is not fully met can 
feel as if he or she has had to make a ‘concession’ or has 
had to face a (however slight) ‘violation’ of rights. How-
ever, when a debate is framed in terms of responsibility, 
focus is placed on the question of who is responsible – 
i.e. who has the ability to react - and with which (scarce) 
resources. 
Third, as responsibility is by definition ‘decentralized’ 
(i.e. the precise action which follows from it depends 
from person to person, from institution to institution, 
state to state, and from place to place and time to time) 
it allows for tailor-made and locally-embedded solutions 
to be conceived. People ‘trained’ in responsibility have 
learned to be sensitive to the world they see around 
them and which (only) they know best. Nurturing 
responsibility therefore is nurturing the capacity for 
people to effectuate change in their own environment. 
Together with a policy of empowering them to realize 
their ideas, human rights needs can be more easily 
detected and answered.  
Fourth, this bridge between universal moral values (the 
concept of dignity, and abstract rights) and locally-
embedded answers would also seem to ease the task of 
establishing a balance between a national (or regional, 
local) identity on the one hand and the idea of European 
space of shared values. European cooperation since 
World War II, after all, has been based, especially within 
the Council of Europe, on the more or less abstract 
principles of human rights, rule of law and political 
democracy. However, especially in recent years, we have 
seen a rise in discourse which can be linked to a search 
for a national identity, which has come to the forefront 
again in the form of several nationalist parties across 
Europe. The ethical concept of responsibility, shared 
between different actors, can therefore function as a 
bridge between these European shared moral values and 
their locally, community-based implementations. 
Fifth, a focus on responsibility inevitably also brings 
into sight the inadequacies of the current international 
political and economic order (Nickel 1993). Focusing on 
rights would seem insufficient without also focusing on 
structural ways how to respect, protect and fulfil them. 
Focusing on responsibility may reveal domains where 
actors are employing rights language and are nominally 
committing to human rights standards, without effect-
tively contributing to the protection of those same rights 
at the same time. Certainly in light of the current crisis, 
the question can be raised whether governments as well 
as powerful individuals and other non-state actors are 
living up to their own rhetoric. 
Sixth, talking about responsibility focuses on a concept 
of citizenship which actively engages citizens, rather than 
make them merely the receivers of government actions. 
It provides a language through which citizens can be 
made aware of their role in society, provided, of course, 
that the balance with individual rights is at all times 
preserved and the individual citizen’s capacity is not 
(legally) overburdened. 
Seventh, balancing rights and responsibility can help 
overcome the antagonistic divide between State and 
individual. Legal rights were originally conceived to 
provide security against arbitrary state interference. 
While this is still an important function of rights today, 
the question can be raised whether in a democratic 
society where the government ought to be representing 
the people this antagonistic division between citizen and 
authorities should at all times maintain the same 
character. Of course, even in a democratic society, rights 
will always have a function in protecting individuals 
against (in the worst case) arbitrary state action and (in 
the best case) well-intended but nevertheless intrusive 
majority rule. Moreover, rights also fulfil a very 
important role by allowing the individual the individual 
to ‘rebel’ against prevailing moral norms, i.e. “the 
freedom to oppose and challenge the values of society 
and its institutions” (Martelli 1998). But by focusing 
solely on rights as providing the citizen with a space 
separated from the government, without also talking 
about the participation which the individual can and 
should enjoy in that government (and society at large), it 
would seem that the antagonism which once protected 
the individual is now potentially harmful to both the 
community and the individual.  
 
4 Integrating the legal, the moral and the ethical  
4.1 Responsibility in human rights texts 
The traditional human rights texts provide no clear 
reference to ‘responsibility’ in the ethical sense des-
cribed above. Nevertheless, some references to ‘duties’ 
and/or ‘responsibilities’ which reveal a similar concern 
can be found. Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, for example, states that “Everyone has 
duties to the community in which alone the free and full 
development of his personality is possible.” However, the 
extent of these duties is not fully clear. The next 
paragraph, after all, states very clearly that individual 
rights can only be limited in very specific cases.
8
 A 
reference to ‘duties’ can also be found in the pre-ambles 
of the two UN Covenants on human rights and in 
paragraph 2 of article 10 (freedom of expression) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, which speaks of 
‘duties and responsibilities’. Outside of Europe, notable 
examples in which duties and responsibilities did receive 
attention include the American Declaration on the Rights 
and Duties of Man and the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights. However, these references seem 
insufficient to restore the balance between rights and 
responsibility envisaged. 
 
4.2 Special declarations 
In the past few decades, there have also been a 
number of initiatives to draft ‘declarations’ explicitly 
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focused on ‘duties and responsibilities’. However, while 
the ethical focus is clearly present, most initiatives suffer 
from a vagueness and conceptual blurring of the legal, 
moral and ethical domain, rendering the initiatives 
vulnerable to (often justified) criticism (see further 
below). A notable initiative in the first half of the ’90 was 
the ‘Declaration toward a global ethic’ by the Parliament 
of the World’s religions (1993), a project headed by Swiss 
theologian Hans Küng. It was followed by an initiative by 
the InterAction Council which is made up of former 
heads of state and government. The InterAction Council 
presented the ‘Universal Declaration of Human 
Responsibilities’ (1997) at the occasion of the 50
th
 
birthday of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
Another significant initiative was the ‘Valencia 
Declaration of Human Duties and Responsibilities’ (2002), 
which was drafted around the same time by a high-level 
group set up by the Valencia Third Millennium 
Foundation and chaired by Richard J. Goldstone. Further 
initiatives include the ‘Trieste Declaration of Human 
Duties’ (1993), drafted by the International Council of 
Human Duties, and the ‘Declaration of the 
Responsibilities of the Present Generations towards 
Future Generations’ (1997). A final document worth 
noting is the rather controversial UN Report on Human 
Rights and Responsibilities, with attached to it the ‘Pre-
draft Declaration on Human Social Responsibilities’ 
(2003). 
 
4.3 Critique: redundancy and threat 
The aforementioned initiatives have been met with a 
great deal of hostility and scepticism. Some sceptics 
simply do not see the need for an explicit reference to 
‘duties and responsibilities’, arguing that such a concept 
is already gaining terrain without too much specific 
attention being devoted to it. Sunstein, for example, 
argued in the mid-nineties already that in several areas 
‘social and legal responsibilities’ had in fact gained 
terrain. The areas he refers to would, moreover, seem to 
have only been more regulated since: “cigarette 
smoking; corporate misconduct; air and water pollution; 
sexual harassment; and racist and sexist speech”. 
Sunstein noted that  
“In all of these areas, people who were formerly 
autonomous, and free to act in accordance with their 
own claims of right, are now subject to socially and 
sometimes legally enforced responsibilities. We have 
seen, in the last few decades, a redefinition of 
responsibility. I do not intend to celebrate these 
definitions, but only to suggest that purely as a matter 
of description, there has been no general shift from 
responsibility to rights.” (Sunstein, 1995) 
Most of the criticism, however, has focused on the way 
in which ‘duties and responsibilities’ have been 
introduced. When the InterAction Council presented its 
‘Draft Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities’, 
Amnesty International reacted with sharp criticism, 
stating that the initiative 
 
“introduces vague and ill-defined notions which can 
only create confusion and uncertainty. Moreover, the 
draft declaration undermines the UDHR by describing 
some rights in a weaker and less precise language than 
the 1948 Declaration. The draft declaration fails to 
build on the historical, practical and symbolic 
importance of the UDHR and contributes little, if 
anything, to the provisions of existing declarations, 
world conference documents and international treaties. 
In short, the draft declaration makes no meaningful 
contribution to the important discussions that must 
take place in the UN during 1998” (Amnesty 
International, 1998). 
 
The main problem with such initiatives, according to 
Amnesty International, is therefore not that these duties 
and responsibilities would not exist, or their existence is 
not useful or not necessary, but that they can and should 
be treated at the same fundamental (and legally 
enforceable) level as rights. The fear exists that, by 
putting certain conceptions of ‘decent behaviour’ at the 
same level as legal rights, the protection of individual 
rights could be made contingent upon the fulfilment of 
certain duties. This would effectively be the end of 
human rights protection, as governments could impose 
duties and deny citizens their rights whenever it seems 
fit. This fear was shared by Valentino Martelli, who, as a 
rapporteur for the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe, wrote that  
 
“If a state were to dictate rules for all human 
behaviour, this would represent a negation of freedom 
and of human rights, since everyone should be 
responsible for his or her own moral and ethical 
behaviour. The result would be a totalitarian state, 
incompatible with the principles and values of the 
Council of Europe. Moral attitudes should remain in the 
realm of an individual’s free choice.”  
 
Martelli continued by holding that 
“This is why human rights and moral and ethical 
obligations should not be juxtaposed, since they belong 
to two different areas, the legal domain and the moral 
and ethical domain. Placing rights and moral 
obligations on the same level entails the risk of 
reducing the effectiveness of these rights, by ignoring 
their legal force, which is stronger than a question of 
morality.” (Martelli, 1998) 
In other words, moral and ethical considerations have 
no place in (quasi-)legal texts. Whenever such lists of 
‘duties and responsibilities’ are drafted, and certainly 
when they are subsequently submitted to an official 
forum such as, for instance, the United Nations, they run 
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the risk of being abused, even if the original intention 
underpinning them was merely to focus on the (often 
widely shared) moral and ethical dimensions of life. As 
for declarations of legal obligations, these would seem to 
be redundant, as States already have sufficient tools to 
make them binding upon citizens through legislation and 
State enforcement mechanisms. Therefore, in short, a 
declaration consisting of moral and ethical guidelines is 
dangerous, and a declaration consisting of legal obli-
gations superfluous. Such a declaration invariably runs 
the risk of being juxtaposed to the traditional human 
rights instruments in the course of which the protection 
or effectuation of certain rights may be arbitrarily made 
dependent on compliance with moral or ethical 
principles. 
 
4.4 The legally elusive character of the ethical 
In the triad ‘obligation’ (legal), ‘duty’ (moral) and ‘res-
ponsibility’ (ethical), the ethical level of individual 
responsibility is clearly the most comprehensive one. It 
could also be thought of as the ‘glue’ necessary for 
keeping a society together. The problem is, however, 
that, aside from the aforementioned dangers involved in 
codifying certain ideas into (binding) texts, the essence 
of individual responsibility cannot be translated into legal 
obligations or even into clear moral duties. As ethical 
responsibility is in essence an attitude which requires 
that a person look for adequate answers in concrete 
situations (a process, rather than an outcome), 
determining in advance exactly which behaviour is 
necessary in each situation is impossible. And whenever 
such an attempt were to be made, it would surely (and 
justifiably so) be met with criticism. ‘Declarations’ 
therefore do not seem like the appropriate way to 
stimulate this individual ‘responsibility’. However, if this 
ethical responsibility is in the first place about an 
attitude, an attitude of care and concern which places 
human dignity at the forefront of one’s decisions, then it 
is clear that awareness about it should be stimulated as 
much as possible, and from an early age onwards. How 
can this ‘hidden face’
9
 of human rights be uncovered? 
 
5  Education in responsibility  
It would seem that, as the ethical dimension of human 
rights cannot be ‘captured’ in legal rights or declarations, 
we have to look at a fundamentally different avenue. 
Education then seems, without doubt, to hold the most 
promising prospects. While this ethical attitude of care 
and concern as such has rarely been explicitly identified 
in the human rights framework, the ‘duties and 
responsibilities’ discourse of the last decades does 
contain a number of elements which intuitively make an 
attempt at integrating this notion of ‘responsibility’ into 
the education system and the school curricula across 
Europe. Especially within the Council of Europe, stress 
has been placed on an education in responsibility which 
is broader than just conveying which ‘civic competences’ 
a person must possess, or which behavioural codes 
individuals must comply with. Already in 1981, the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe decided 
“to promote an awareness of the requirements of human 
rights and the ensuing responsibilities in a democratic 
society, and to this end, in addition to human rights 
education, to encourage the creation in schools, from the 
primary level upwards, of a climate of active 
understanding of and respect for the qualities and culture 
of others” (CoE Committee of Ministers 1981). Other 
initiatives include the ‘Resolution on Education for 
Democracy, Human rights and Tolerance’ by the Standing 
Conference of European Ministers of Education (1994), 
‘Recommendation 1401’ of the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Council of Europe (1998), the ‘Declaration and 
Programme on Education for Democratic Citizenship 
based on the rights and responsibilities of citizens’ by the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (1999), 
the ‘Resolution on Responsible Citizenship and 
Participation in Public Life’ by the Congress of Local and 
Regional Authorities (2000) and the ‘Council of Europe 
Charter on Education for Democratic Citizenship and 
Human Rights Education’ (2010).  
As Cernilogar and Coertjens argue, in the framework of 
the Council of Europe’s ‘draft European Charter on 
shared social responsibility’, and regarding a conception 
of a shared responsibility which, although not fully the 
same, is certainly relevant to the one defended in this 
article, such a shared responsibility will not be 
established automatically, but rather requires “a 
structural effort to spread this concept throughout 
society and to ensure that everyone can participate in it” 
(Cernilogar, Coertjens 2011). It is important that 
‘everyone’ is indeed everyone, and not some ‘democratic 
elite’. For this reason, the authors argue that therefore 
“[e]veryone needs to be empowered and enabled to 
understand and take part in these new deliberative 
processes; therefore, they need to also become an 
intrinsic part of the educational system” (Cernilogar, 
Coertjens 2011). The authors also stress the need for 
intergenerational responsibility, as today’s decisions will 
have long-lasting consequences for the young and also 
future generations. They note that education has the 
added advantage of already integrating this intergene-
rational element. This process of empowerment should 
start as early as elementary school so that, from a young 
age onwards, “they too can be recognised as actors” 
(Cernilogar, Coertjens 2011). Actors, who are auto-
nomous and confident in their capacity (following the 
insights of Frankfurt and Dworkin) to formulate ‘higher-
order preferences’ which take into account the need to 
bring about the realisation of human rights (human 
dignity); actors, moreover, who have learned to be 
sensitive to the needs of the people they encounter in 
life, both within a close circle of influence and beyond. 
Which techniques can be employed to train this 
reflexive process in (young) individuals? This question 
would seem open to further research and different 
approaches can likely be conceived, depending on the 
cultural context. As stated at the outset, the argument 
advanced in this article is that of the necessity of 
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education in individual responsibility as a necessary 
complement to knowledge and skills regarding the 
human rights framework. Naturally, however, such 
education would be closely connected to what is often 
referred to as the not uncontested (and much broader) 
notions of ‘citizenship education’ and ‘civic compe-
tences’. How this individual responsibility described in 
this article relates to the broader question of such 
citizenship education, is a matter for further analysis. It 
would not seem illogical that, as Cernilogar and Coertjens 
hold, elements such as ‘active participation’, ‘dialogue’, 
‘distribution of responsibility’, ‘the ability to take on a 
different perspective’ and ‘the ability to argue one’s own 
standpoint’ would be very relevant in such an 
educational project. Both authors would also prima facie 
seem to have a point that ‘shared social responsibility’ 
must be learned “through examples, games and stories, 
and can progressively take on more complex forms, in 
line with a child’s age” However, they also note that “the 
real change of mindset comes through practice and for 
this reason starting with engaging children is crucial” 
(Cernilogar & Coertjens, 2011).  The authors rightly stress 
the importance of both formal and informal education in 
acquiring this practice, noting that the idea of shared 
social responsibility in the first place should be a practice 
experienced by the students, not a theoretical concept.  
As responsibility as described in this article is in the first 
place an attitude of care towards the others and society 
which must be actively created and maintained, it must 
become a reflex based on a person’s own experience. 
Education should therefore not in its turn and in its own 
way duplicate the mistakes made by the ‘declarations 
movement’, where often well-intentioned initiatives 
collided with stark rejection by trying to ‘tell people what 
to do’, and where legal, moral and ethical requirements 
were simply brought together. Undoubtedly, part of a 
good education does involve telling children and 
youngsters about certain well-defined duties and 
obligations they have in life and within society, but it is 
not here that the focus of the education in the concept 
of responsibility as a necessary complement to the 
human rights framework must lie.  
 
6 Conclusion 
Education in individual responsibility (in the ethical sense 
set out in this article) is not the same as informing 
individuals about their and other people’s human rights 
but it is also very different from telling people exactly 
‘what to do’. It involves the creation and nurturing of 
reflexes which put sensitivity and concern for the 
(human dignity and human rights) needs of other people 
and the community at large, first. As such, education in 
individual responsibility is also the missing factor or the 
‘hidden face’ in the contemporary human rights 
framework, and pivotal to this framework’s survival in 
the (near) future.  
The need for education in individual responsibility does 
not detract from the important responsibility of the State 
to respect, protect and fulfil human rights. Ultimately, 
States are in many ways still the most powerful actors, 
and their share of the ‘shared responsibility’ is therefore 
substantial. Moreover, through various conventions 
virtually all States to a greater or lesser extent have 
committed themselves to – often legally enforceable – 
human rights standards. These State obligations remain 
untouched and human rights institutions, such as the 
European Court of Human Rights, will continue to 
monitor compliance and can sanction where necessary. 
However, the top-down approach of the State, as ne-
cessary as it is, cannot guarantee human dignity for all, 
everywhere and at all times. To make even an attempt at 
this, all individuals and actors within society need to be 
mobilized, so that the gaps inevitably left by the top-
down approach are filled. 
One question which remains is how education in 
individual responsibility relates to freedom of thought 
and conscience, and freedom of education.  The fact that 
education in individual responsibility focuses on re-
flective processes rather than on well-defined ‘things to 
do’ or ‘norms to comply with’ also means that it is not 
only radically different from indoctrination, but also 
should protect people against exactly this. Education in 
individual responsibility focuses on making people reflect 
on themselves and their own environment and situation, 
and on challenging them to formulate answers according 
to their own beliefs and convictions. It is not about 
telling people what to do, but about teaching them to 
identify the situations they are faced with, and 
subsequently asking them what they believe is the 
necessary and appropriate response in those situations. 
In as far as certain values inherent to the democratic 
society, such as, for instance, ‘tolerance’, ‘pluralism’ and 
‘broadmindedness’ (ECtHR, Handyside case, 1976) are 
actively promoted through such reflective processes, this 
would seem to be a conditio sine qua non for the survival 
of the democratic society. In as far as education can 
never be completely value-free, it is therefore not 
illogical for it to promote the basic attitudes under-
pinning a democratic society which allow all individuals 
within society to form their opinions and cherish their 
own beliefs. Whereas this framework can sustain a 
certain degree of indifference (or even rejection) of the 
democratic values on the individual level, on a structural 
level these values must be defended. If not, the 
democratic society runs the risk of destroying itself. This 
principle can also be found clearly in, for instance, the 
German Basic Law and the principle of the ‘streitbare 
Demokratie’, or in article 17 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights, which prohibits reliance on the 
Convention with the aim of destroying the rights and 
freedoms listed therein. Education in individual res-
ponsibility thus does not aim at supplanting individual 
convictions and imposing values; the societal values it 
pre-supposes merely form the glue between the myriad 
of individual and collective convictions already present 
and developing within society. 
With the consequences of the financial crisis still 
looming large over the European continent, individual 
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responsibility can also be the key in the search for new 
answers and creative distributions of labour in a society 
which strives, in the first place, for the respect and 
protection of the human dignity of all. The impotence of 
the State to guarantee in several cases even the most 
basic of rights of its citizens, especially the young and the 
vulnerable, can easily lead to disillusionment with the 
democratic society as a project, and even lead to the 
questioning of the relevance of the human rights frame-
work all together. Merely teaching young people about 
which rights they have, and how a democratic society 
should ideally function, would seem to be insufficient 
when claims for respect for basic aspects of human 
dignity remain unanswered. Rather, as a complement to 
State obligations, abstract human rights standards and 
related duties, individuals, from an early age onwards, 
need to learn to discern the human dignity needs of the 
people around them and to formulate new and creative 
answers based on their own experience. To this end, 
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1 According to art. 10 §2 ECHR, any restriction or limitation requires a 
legal basis and one of several given legitimate aims, and must also be 
necessary in a democratic society. 
2 As I choose to follow the aforementioned authors in assigning a 
different term to the legal, moral and ethical realm respectively, the 
references to ‘legal obligation’, ‘moral duty’ and ‘ethical reponsibility’ 
are in fact pleonasms. However, for the clarity of the article and for 
readers who are not familiar with this distinction, I choose to retain 
these indications. 
3 I speak of ‘human duty’ to make clear that I see this kind of duty as 
the logical corollary of a human right, and both of them as tools to, 
ultimately, protect human dignity. 
4 The ultimate philosophical foundations of human rights have 
deliberately always been left more or less vague in the most important 
international texts, exactly with a view to bridging cultural and 
philosophical differences. However, ‘human dignity’ (with all the 
conceptual lack of clarity it entails) is generally accepted as the central 
value which is protected by human rights. 
5 In some cases (but this is beyond the scope of this paper) we may also 
have a duty to protect another person’s dignity where this person does 
not necessarily have a corollary right (as is, for example, the case when 
I am faced with a duty to save someone’s life with little or no cost to 
myself). 
6 In this figure, a debtor or sponsor would commit to a certain action. A 
re-sponsor would guarantee, in his own name and with his own 
fortune, towards the primary beneficiary, in case the sponsor would be 
unable to fulfil his obligation. 
 
 
7 The sources I refer to speak of ‘duties (and responsibilities)’, however, 
I believe the notion of responsibility as set out above would aptly 
describe also what was intended by the respective authors. 
8 “In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject 
only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose 
of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of 
others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order 
and the general welfare in a democratic society.” 
9 This term (in French: ‘face cachée’) was coined at a conference 
organized in 2004 in Brussels on the topic of responsibility in human 
rights law (Dumont et al, 2005). 
